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How To Avoid Another Banking Crisis
by

Economics Team
Judged Best In U.S.
The Harding University Economics Team has
captured the national championship for the fourth
time in the Students in Free Enterprise (SIPE)
competition in New Orleans, La., July 9-10. The
student team and faculty sponsor, Dr. Don Diffine,
were awarded a first place trophy and a check for
$3,000 at the awards banquet.
The competition, which was hosted by the
Associates for Free Enterprise and co-sponsored by
the National Free Enterprise Center in Boliver,
Mo., involved more than 90 colleges and universities and some 4,000 students during 1983-84. The
national SIPE competition brought 18 regional
winners together for two days of intensive competition. Forty judges from business and corporations across the United States evaluated each
finalist.
Team members include Byron Carlock of
Blytheville, Ark., Glenda Collier of Memphis,
Tenn., De,bbie Garrett of Brookston, Ind., Bruce
Picker of Searcy, Ark., Ellen Reid of Sugar Land,
Texas, Mel Sansom of Pensacola, Fla., Jeff Tennyson of Harrison, Ark. and Kevin Thompson of
San Diego, Calif.
Two of the team's projects drew special mention
- a "Free Market Calendar" and the Personalized
Employee Economic Program (PEEP). The PEEP
program was designed to assist employees to
become more knowledgeable and aware of the
economic system in which they work. This year's
championship, combined with national trophies in
1980, 1981 and 1982, establishes Harding as the
winningest team in the country. Harding was
runnerup in 1978 and 1983.

Catherine England
Policy Analyst
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
The recent problems at Continental Illinois Bank and
Trust Company seem to have raised the specter of 1930sstyle crashes and bank runs. A number of editorialists
and news commentators point to the near-failure of the
nation's ninth largest bank as "proof' that a deregulated
banking system would not work.
For consumers of banking services and the econom! as
a whole, however, this message fails to identify the true
culprit in the Continental Illinois debacle. The seeds of
Continental's fate were sown long ago when the bank's
management decided to invest in a fairly concentrated,
potentially volatile loan portfolio.
More important, these investment decisions were
made possible, even encouraged, by the existing system
of federal deposit insurance and regulatory oversight.
Until the real causes of Continental's troubles are addressed, other banks can be expected to stumble and
even collapse. To correct these problems, a greatly expanded reliance on market forces is needed.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM'S
WEAKNESSES
The 1933 and 1934 laws that were designed to
regulate, and restore confidence in, the nation's banking
system bear a large share of the responsibility for the
problems facing the financial services industry today.
This is particularly true of federal deposit insurance.
These insurance practices actually create a "moral
hazard" - they encourage insured depository institutions to take additional risks. As a result, they are a
potentially destabilizing force within the industry.
There are two problems with practices at the Federal
Deposit Ir:surance Corporation (FDIC). First, while the
private insurance industry attempts to adjust premiums
to reflect the. risk presented by the insured, the FDIC
charges each insured bank at the same rate - a set
percentage of its total domestic deposits - regardless of
how well or how poorly the institution is run.

Second, federal regulators traditionally have protected
deposits exceeding the legally insured limit (currently
$100,000)by arranging the mergers of failing institutions
if at all possible. The acquiring bank was then made
responsible for all deposit liabilities of the acquired
institution.

potential contributor to the bank's difficulties. Rather
than being able to finance its growth through expanding
its base of small depositors, Continental was forced to
enter the higher-cost market for large, uninsured
deposits. The result was not only higher costs, but also a
more volatile deposit base.

These policies removed many of the disincentives for
taking on excessive .risk generally faced by bank
managers. Because bank management did not pay a
higher premium to the FDIC when it invested in a risky
loan portfolio, there was no explicit penalty for such
behavior. Consequently, any additional profits realized,
if the loans paid off, accrued solely to the bank. Nor have
large depositors, whose funds theoretically are at risk,
had a strong incentive to discipline risk-loving bankers.
Until recently their depositors had good reason to feel
almost as secure as their counterparts with accounts
containing only a few hundred dollars.

Thus, as economic and technological changes have
forced market responses that dictate some degree of
deregulation, concern has grown over the role the FDIC
plays in encouraging risk-taking among depository
institutions. Recognizing the problems inherent in the
existing system, and concerned that deregulation be
allowed to proceed so that similar troubles may be
avoided in the future, William Isaac, Chairman of the
FDIC, has devised a two-part plan for introducing
additional market discipline into the system.

Because the system of deposit insurance provided no
direct means for discouraging excessive risk-taking,
regulation of the industry has been viewed as an important mechanism for controlling the activities of
banks, and hence, the risk exposure of the federal
government. Thus, the Depression-era banking
legislation not only sought to insure the safety of
deposits, but also attempted to limit the competition
engaged in by banks, thereby minimizing the number of
possible failures.
As a result, regulations arose limiting the interest that
could be paid depositors, the range of services that could
be offered by a bank, and the type of assets in which a
bank could invest its funds . State regulations, meanwhile, have often limited the ability of banks to establish
branches through which they could gather deposits and
expand customer service.
Many of these 1930s efforts to provide stability have
proved to have been misguided. Historical hindsight as
well as additional experience with rapidly changing
market conditions have shown that such restrictions are
contributing to current problems. For example, the
interest rate restrictions established during the
Depression to limit the competition for deposits proved
almost fatal to many depository institutions in recent
years when sustained inflation rates led depositors to
search for financial instruments paying a market rate of
return.
Banks and thrift institutions found themselves unable
to compete as money market mutual funds offered even
relatively small savers significantly higher returns.
Similarly, savings and loan associations were seriously
weakened by statutory requirements that their loan
portfolios be devoted almost exclusively to long-term
home mortgages. Unable to diversify, savings and loans
were forced to bear an inordinate degree of risk, particularly during the period when interest rates were
moving steadily upward.
Most recently, Illinois branching laws limiting
Continental to a single office have been criticized as a

EFFORTS TO REFORM THE SYSTEM
Isacc's first step was to serve notice to depositors with
accounts exceeding $100,000 that they could no longer
count on the FDIC to bail them out in the event of a
failure. When Penn Square Bank in Oklahoma was
allowed to fail in July 1982, a number of large depositors,
including Continental Illinois, were surprised to find
themselves left to sustain significant losses. During early
1984, the FDIC continued this course by letting large
depositors stand in line with other general creditors
awaiting liquidation of failed banks' assets, despite the
fact that mergers were arranged with healthy institutions.
In addition, Isaac has been advocating congressional
action to allow the introduction of risk-related
premiums. He has argued that all banks should be
assigned to one of three risk categories and that their
total yearly premiums should, to some degree, reflect the
competitive risk the institutions represent to the insurance fund.
These policy changes are moves in the right direction.
The reaction of the federal banking authorities to the
Continental Illinois scare, however, has been a retreat in
the FDIC's efforts to introduce market discipline into
bank management. And the fact that Continental came
so close to failing has raised anew in the minds of many
an unfounded fear that a less regulated banking system
would somehow prove unstable.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS DECISION
Events at Continental Illinois in early May demonstrated how well the FDIC's efforts were working. Isaac's
actions during the past two years had convinced
depositors with accounts exceeding $100,000 that they
could no longer rely on an automatic federal bail-out.
But when many of these depositors viewed their funds at
Continental as being a risk and began behaving
rationally by withdrawing them, the federal banking
authorities stepped in. To stem the flow of funds, the
FDIC and the Federal Reserve System guaranteed that
all depositors and other creditors of Continental would
be made whole regardless of the cost.

In taking this step, the federal banking regulators, in
effect, created a two-tiered banking system. They appear
to have placed the nation's largest banks above the new
market disciplines that have been introduced, thus
providing these banks with a significant advantage in
attracting funds that was not provided to their smaller
competitors.

ADVANTAGES OF A MARKET SYSTEM
Attempts to protect the financial industry and the
economy from the shocks of a large bank's failure,
therefore, create incentives that could lead to increasing
instability and additional government involvement. This
repeats the whole cycle of excessive regulation, leading to
unnecessary risk exposure and ever more instability.

Over the past two years, depositors with accounts
exceeding $100,000 in smaller banks increasingly have
been forced to bear a risk that funds placed in a poorly
run bank may be lost. This has been a change for the
better. The threat that the larger, more sophisticated
depositors will move their accounts if exposed to excessive risk is potentially much more effective than any
regulatory action could be in curbing excessive risktaking.

The escape from this dilemma is a deregulated,
market-disciplined banking system. Existing weaknesses
within the banking system merely require that the steps
toward that environment be well considered and
carefully taken. It is crucial to the success of a
deregulated financial industry that federal deposit insurance incorporate market discipline to the broadest
extent possible. Ultimately, the system should be
privatized.

With the Continental decision, however, federal
regulators placed the nation's larger banks outside this
new market discipline rule. Depositors with accounts of
more than $100,000 in very large banks need not worry
about their funds being at risk. With their sweeping
guarantees at Continental, the FDIC and the Federal
Reserve Board have removed the incentive for depositors
to monitor the behavior of bank managers - at least at .
some banks.

First, blanket guarantees, like that given Continental;
should not be available - regardless of the bank's size.
Should a run by the large depositors of a particular bank
become a threat, some orderly means of payment by
federal regulators could surely be devised that would
prevent the panic from spreading to other institutions.

As a result, the message sent by the Continental
decision has potentially far-reaching consequences. It
may do more to encourage concentration of the U.S.
banking industry than deregulation could. In fact, under
a deregulated system with market discipline applying
equally to all banks, smaller banks would have certain
advantages in attracting deposits. Smaller banks would
be less likely to establish subsidiaries through which to
offer a broad range of financial services. Because these
banks would probably remain more concerned with
narrow banking interests, they could be more easily
monitored by their large depositors.
In addition, any one large depositor could be expected
to exert greater influence on the behavior of individuals
managing a smaller bank. But, other considerations
remaining equal, there would be little point in taking the
trouble to monitor a small bank now that implicit 100
percent insurance has been provided depositors in the
larger banks. The result of the government's decisions
concerning Continental Illinois will almost certainly be a
flow of deposits exceeding $100,000 to the nation's
biggest banks.
A bank's growth to a size which makes it "too large to
be allowed to fail" thus becomes an important asset.
Large banks, whose status might be unclear in the event
of pending failure, may well attempt to grow rapidly,
thereby guaranteeing their own future existence and
share of large depositors. Such efforts could trigger a
"growth at all costs" policy in some banks, increasing
the risks these managers are willing to undertake. The
result would be a potentially weaker, increasingly unstable banking system requiring ever increasing
government guarantees.

Even an announced policy of guaranteeing, say, 70 to
80 perce11t of deposits in excess of $100,000 would be
better than the Continental decision. Such a policy
would, first, ensure a degree of market discipline at large
banks, as depositors were forced to bear a certain
amount of risk. In addition, a demand for private deposit
insurance might be generated by those depositors who
stood to lose a portion of their funds.
Second, Congress should allow the FDIC to introduce
risk-related premiums. While the risk of failure
presented by a particular institution is of an admittedly
subjective nature, private firms regularly make such
judgments. The safety of bank stocks as an investment,
the large, negotiable certificates of deposit offered by
banks, and at least some portions of a depository's loan
portfolios are regularly scrutinized by a wide range of
private individuals and firms, including investment
counselors and private consultants.
The FDIC should be allowed to purchase this information to compare with the assessments of its own
and other federal bank examiners in assigning banks to
risk categories. The lack of expertise among the federal
regulators when compared with their private sector
counterparts is especially apparent where loans to
particular, specialized industries are concerned. For
instance, the FDIC cannot be expected to evaluate a loan
portfolio containing a large percentage of energy Joans
nearly as efficiently as can private analysts who specialize
in appraising energy securities.
These composite FDIC risk classifications also should
be made public. While many will argue that such information could serve to destabilize the industry by
causing large shifts of funds out of banks placed in the
more risky categories, it is exactly this threat that will
serve most effectively to encourage more prudent
behavior among bankers.

Gradually the maximum deposit covered by federal
deposit insurance should be reduced. This would encourage the development of private deposit insurance
alongside, if not in place of, federally provided insurance. Private deposit insurance would benefit the
economy in general and consumers of banking services in
particular.

In some cases, regulations designed in the 1930s to
limit competition have failed to protect banks and,
instead, left them dangerously exposed when they were
unable to respond to rapidly changing economic con·
ditions. In other instances, regulators have found they
were unable to prevent excessive risk-taking activities
because of inadequate or perverse incentives provided by
the tools at their disposal.

For example, private providers of deposit insurance
would be much more responsive to early indications that
an insured depository institution was taking on additional risk. The decision to invest in a ·highly concentrated, potentially volatile loan portfolio would
undoubtedly be penalized from the beginning, regardless
of how promising such loans might appear initially.

The answer to today's banking problems is not additional regulation or more powerful regulators, which
would only generate a future crisis as market conditions
changed more rapidly than regulatory behavior. What
U.S. banking needs is more reliance on market discipline
and less on regulation.

In addition, private insurers would have much more
flexibility in responding to the risk presented by an
insured institution. The development of a new line of
financial services might be permitted without an increase
in premiums if the bank first raised additional equity
capital.

Federal banking authorities should once again
establish that the funds of large depositors are at risk,
regardless of the size of the bank in which they are
placed. The FDIC should be allowed to apply risk-based
premiums, using information and assessments available
in the private sector to assist in assigning risk categories.

Broadly based deregulation of the banking industry is,
therefore, not necessarily inconsistent with stability,
safety, and the security of depositors' funds. Ultimately
required is an increased reliance on and willingness to
accept additional market discipline of the banking
industry including risk-based premiums and,
eventually, private deposit insurance.

Finally, the size of deposit covered should be reduced
gradually. This would increase the market pressure from
depositors, which would create stronger incentives for
prudent banking behavior and the development of a
market for private deposit insurance.

CONCLUSION
The troubles at Continental Illinois and other banks
do not stem from deregulation. They come from the
regulatory and deposit insurance system.

Only when federal authorities begin to understand and
use the power of market discipline can deregulation
proceed in an orderly fashion.
Reprinted with permission from The Backgrounder, a
June 22, 1984 publication of The Heritage Foundation,
Washington, D.C.
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